It is not all that long ago that our military enemy could be described as large, well defined states with clear military, political, social, or economic goals. Today, we have an enemy that is almost the polar opposite. As Steven Metz has put it, these terrorists are seeking to:

• avoid battlespaces where they are at a distinct disadvantage,
• postpone decisive action avoid defeats
• sustain themselves,
• expand support,
• and ultimately swing the balance of power in their favor.

Simply put, the machinery we have built over the past 30 years is not suited for this type of adversary.

Terrorists rely heavily on Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) as their weapon of choice. The statistics on IEDs are staggering; they are the leading cause of military troop deaths in Iraq, and since the start of the war over 25,000 IEDs have been targeted at US troops.

To date, most anti-IED efforts have centered on developing techniques to stop, negate, or minimize the damage of the blast. Examples include increased armor to minimize the blast or electronic jammers/pulses that stop the detonation or preemptively detonate the device.

Several approaches are being developed within the intelligence community in an attempt to move "left of boom": in other words, stop IED attacks before they happen. To accomplish this goal, we must be more effective in identifying the sources of attacks against US troops including:

• Identifying key actors in the IED production process: the financier, bombmaker, placer, and triggerman.
• Detecting when terror networks are changing: adding, removing, or changing membership and new expertise.
• Identifying the types of activities that might be indicative of large scale production of IEDs.

In future articles, we will bring you more details on these approaches and how they are being applied in the real world.

I look forward to your feedback on my thoughts.

Jim
jim.nolan@dac.us